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of his car by the permittee, even though it be uncontradicted 
(Prickett v. Whapples, 10 Cal.App.2d 701, 703-705 [52 P.2d 
972] ), and many times this court h88 affirmed judgments in 
favor of the plaintiffs upon testimony as meagre as that which 
supports the court's findings in the, presen.t case. (Hicks v. 
Reis, 21 Cal.2d 654 [134'P.2d 788] ; Blank v. Coffin, 20 Cal.2d 
457 [126 P.2d 868].) The application of the rule announced 
in those cases that any reasonable doubt should be resolved 
in favor of the conclusion by the trier of fact should not be 
limited to but one party to an action unde::.- that statute and, 
in my opinion, compels agreement with the finding that Corti 
was not the agent of Arthur Gigli. Of· course, if Corti was 
not the agent of Arthur, then obviously the former's use of 
the car at the time of the accident was not Arthur's use, and 
the entire structure upon which the majority and concurring 
opinions are predicated collapses, as under no theory of con-
struction, could Corti's use then be said to be the one to which 
Joseph Gigli had consented. 
For these reasons I believe that the judgment should be 
affirmed as to both Joseph Qigli and Arthur Gigli. 
[So F. No. 16873. In Bank. July 8, 1943.] 
MRS. W. A. ALLEN et al., Respondents, v CALIFORNIA 
MUTUAL BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATION (a 
Corporation) et al., Appellants. 
[1] Appeal-Law of Oase.-All questions and issues adjudicated 
on a prior appeal are the law of the case upon subsequent ap-
peals and will not be reconsidered. 
[2] Id.-Law of Oase-Decisions of What Oourt.-The doctrine 
that all' questions and issues adjudicated on a prior appeal 
Mclt. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 1317; [2] Appeal 
and Error, § 1326; [3] Appeal and Error, § 1337; [4-6,14] Build-
ing and Loan Associations, § 16; [7,15] Appeal and Error, § 1329; 
[8] Appeal and Error, § 1333; [9,12] Appeal and Error, § 1344; 
[10,11] Limitation of Actions,§ 61(6); [13] Equity, § 37; [16] 
Appeal and Error, § 1328; [17-19] Building and Loan Associations, 
§18. 
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are the law of the case applies to decisions of the District Courts 
of Appeal after they have become final. 
[3] Id.-Law of Oase-Sufficiency of Oomplaint.-Where the suffi-
ciency of a complaint is considered on a prior appeal, the doc-
trine of the law of the case does not apply if the,evidence does 
not support the allegations of the complaint. . 
[4] .Building arid Loan Associationg...-;.Insolvency-Rights of Stock-
holders-As Investors.-In an action to establish the claims 
of holders of certificates of a building- and loan association in 
liquidation, plaintiffs proved a case '~ithin the decision ~n a 
prior appeal, where it was shuwn that the association and 
an agency company fraudulentlY induced them to exchange 
their certificates for the company's stock, that they signed 
orders for the withdrawal of their deposits, which were cred-
ited to the company's purchase of theassoclation's guaran-
teed stock, that the permits issued to the company by the 
Corporation Commissioner were conditioned upon the sale 
of stock for cash, but the company received no cash for 'its 
stock, and that the permits were tJ.Ot exhibited to plaintiffs 
as required by their terms. , 
[5a,5b] Id.-InsolvencY-Rights of Stockholderg...-;.As Investors.-
In an I,lction to establish the claims as investors of certain cer-
tificate holders ?f a building and loan association in liquidation 
who had been mduced to exchange their certificates for the 
securit,ies of an agency corporation, the holding upon a, prior 
appeal that investors who, by reason of fraudulent representa-
tions, made tl'ansf~rs ?f their certificates, or amounts repre-
sent~d thereby appearmg upon the books of the association, 
contlnuedto be lithe owners of their original certificates" and 
were entitled to share in subsequent dividends declared' by 
the commissioner, ignored the meaning of the Building and 
Loan Association Act, § 13.16, and the. purpose of its enactmelit: 
[6] Id.~Insol~ency-Rights of .Stockholderg...-;.Purpose of Statute. 
-The intention of the Legislature in enacting the Building and 
Loan Association Act, § 13.16, and the 1935 amendment thereto 
(Stats.1935, p.1500; Deering's Gen. Laws 1935 Supp., Act 986) 
was to liberalize the statutory requirements for the filing of a 
claim in favor of one who, as admitted by the books of the 
association, was an investor of the institution at the time it 
was taken over by the commissioner. 
[7] Appeal-Law of Oase-Erroneous Decisions.-In an action to 
establish the claims as investors of certain certificate holders 
of a building and loan association in liquidation, whereon a 
prior appeal the court erroneously construed and applied, the' 
provisions of the Building and Loan Association Act, § i3j6, 
... / 
i I 
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the trial court's determination of plaintiffs' rights, by follow-
ing the law of the case, did not lead to the result contemplated 
by the rule allowing an exception to that doctrine when its 
application would lead to an injustice, where plaintiffs had 
the same dghts to share in the proceeds of the liquidation of 
the association as the plaintiffs in a similar case previously ad-
jUdicated. 
[8] Id.-Law of Case-Questions Not Presented.-All questions 
presented by the record must be raised upon the first appeal 
from an adverse ruling. 
[9] Id.-Law of Case-Limitations.-In an action to establish 
the claims as investors of certain certificate hoIdel's of a build-
ing and loan association in liquidation who had been induced 
to exchange their certificates for the securities of an agency 
corporation, where defendants in their answer pleaded the 
statute of limitations and the trial court granted judgment 
on the pleadings, a holding that the cause of action was not 
barred by limitations was implicit in the order granting the 
plaintiffs' motion for a new trial. 
[10] Limitation of Actione-Commencement of .Period-Fraud-
Discovery-Notice of Facts.-In an action to establish the 
claims of certificate holders of a building and loan association 
in liquidation who had been induced by fraudulent representa-
tions to exchange their certificates for the securities of an 
agency corporation, even assuming that upon receipt of their 
stock in the agency corporation the plaintiffs were notified of 
the falsity of the representation t.hat they would be entitled 
to withdraw their money by the absence of any language to 
that effect in the stock certificates, the discovery of such 
falsity did not give notice that other representations concern-
ing the company were untrue. 
[11] Id.- Commencement of Period-Fraud-Discovery-Notice 
of Facts.-In an action to establish the claims as investors of 
certain certificate holders of a building and loan association 
in liquidation who had been induced by fraudulent representa-
tions to exchange their certificates for the securities of an 
agency company, the fact that after the company's failure 
to declare a dividend some of the plaintiffs endeavored to· 
obtain from the company's officers the amount of their invest. 
ments or joined a stockholders' committee which employed an 
attorney to protect their interests did not compel a holding 
that the statute of limitations commenced to run at that time, 
where it was also shown that the officers countered the plain. 
[9] See 2 Cal.Jur. 966, 967; 3 Am.Jur. 549. 
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tiffs' complaints with explanations based upon the economic 
depression and that plaintiffs continued to rely upon the good 
faith, wisdom and advice of the officers and did not learn that 
their stock was valueless until the subsequent adjudication of 
the company in bankruptcy. 
[12] Appeal-Law of Case-Limitations.-In an action to estab-
lish the claims as investors of certain certificate holders of a 
building and loan association in. liquidation who had been 
induced by fraudulent representations to exchange their cer-
tificates for the securities of an agency corporation, assuming 
that the process of liquidation, within the meaning of Code 
Civ. Proc., § 348, commenced when the commissioner took over 
the association, the plaintiffs may not on appeal raise the issue 
that the acdon is barred by the statute of limitations for that 
reason, where that question was concluded bya prior appeal. 
[13] Equity - Laches-Elements-Delay.-Delay alone does not 
. constitute laches unless it is accompanied by circumstances 
from which prejudice may result. 
[14] Building and Loan Associations - Insolvency-Rights of 
StockhOlders-Construction of Statute.-The use of the· word 
"hereafter" in the 1935 amendment to § 13.16 of the Building 
and Loan Association Act expresses a legislative intention 
that the amendment should apply to dividends declared after 
its effective date, in the assets of associations then in the 
·~rocess of liquidation. . 
[15a,15b] Appeal-Law of Case-Erroneous Decisions.~In· an 
action to establish the claims as investors of certain certificate 
holders of a building and loan association in liquidation who. 
had been induced to exchange their certificates for the secu· 
rities of an agency corporation, where discussion in the opin-
ion on a prior appeal was based upon. an erroneous assumption 
as to the facts, it was obiter dictum and the court w.as not re-
quired, by the doctrine of the law of the case, to follow the 
prior erroneous interpretation. 
[16] Id.-Law of Case-Obiter Dictum.-The doctrine of the law 
of the case does not require an appellate court to follow an 
interpretation which is clearly obiter dictum. 
[17] Building and Loan Associations - Insolvency-Liquidation 
Proceedings by Commissioner-Interest.-Where the Building 
and Loan Commissioner takes possession of the property~ 
business and assets of a building and. loan association, ·if the 
association is subsequently allowed to resume business as a 
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pay interest upon the deposits of its investors, even as to the 
period during which its assets were in the t~mporary control 
of the commissioner; but, if instaad of restonng the property, 
business and assets to the association, the commissioner deter-
mines to liquidate them, the right of the. investors to interest 
shouid be subject to the principle of equality among creditors. 
[t8] ld.-lnsolvency-Liquidation Proceedings by Commissioner-
lnterest.-':'In the absence of express statutory provision, an 
investor in a building and loan association in the proc~ss of 
. liquidation by the commissioner is not entitled to the pay-
ment of interest on his claim after the commencement of the 
liquidation. proceeding, where the assets are insufficient to pay 
. the principal of all claims in full. . 
[19] ld • ......:lnsolvency-~iquidation Proceedings by Commissioner 
-lnterest.,---In an action to establish the claims as investors 
of certain' certificate holders of a huilding and loan associa-
tion in liquidation who hadbeenhiduced to exchange their. 
certificates for the securities of an agency corporation, ajudg-
ment for plaintiffs allowing interest to the date of the pay-
ment of the claims should be . modified by inserting ,in lieu 
thereof a provision for its payment to the date bf the. com" 
mencemimt of the liquidation proceedings. (Building and Loan 
Association Act, § 13.16.) 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Santa 
Clara County. Maurice T. Dooling, Jr., Judge assigned. 
Modified and affirmed. 
Action to establish claims against a building and loan asso-
ciation in liquidation. Judgment for plaintiffs modified and 
affirmed. 
Robert W. Kenny, Attorney General, 1. M. Peckham and 
Lenore D. Underwood, Deputies Attorney General, D. T. 
Jenkins and Patrick J. Kearns for Appellants. 
Frank W. Sawyer and Wm. R. Biaggj for Respondents. 
EDMONDS, J.-So far as the merits of the controversy 
are concerned, Allen and those who in the superior court 
established their right to share in the assets of California 
Mutual Building and Loan Association, are in the same posi-
tion as the investors. whose judgment against that now insolv-
ent corporation was affirmed in Alexander v. State Callital 
July 1943] ALLEN V. CAL. MUTUALB. & L._ AssN. 
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Co., 9 Ca1.2d 304 [70 P.2d 619]. The association and the 
Building and Loan Commissioner,' in appealing from the 
judgment rendered against them, do not deny that, by fraudu-
lent representations, the respondentS were induced to. ex-
change their investment certificates forstor.k of-the State Cap-
ital Company, but they contend that (1) the fanIure to file a 
claim against the insolvent corporation; (2)· the· statute: of 
limitations; and (3) laches, bar any recovery by them. 
In their second amended complaint, the respondents alleged 
that prior to January 23, 1933, each of them. became, and 
still is,an investor in the association by the purchase of an 
investment certificate and a deposit of money -which is re-
corded in a pass book a'ccount and deposit book. 'On that date 
the associationwa'S taken over by the Building and Loan 
Commissioner for the purpose of liquidation. Four years pre-
viously, State Capital Company was organized as an agency 
of and for, the purpose of assisting the association in the 
transa'Ction of its nusiness. By fraudulent representations of 
the association's agents during the period from 1929 to 1931, 
the respondents were induced to exchange their; "invest. 
ments" for shares of stock of State Capital Company, to their 
damage in the' amount of their respective deposits in the 
association. 
The complaint refers to the respondents not oniy as the 
own~rsof building and loan investment certificates but also 
as "investors" having "investments" or "holdings"inthe 
, association. The record is not specific in identifying the status 
of each one of them, but from the findings it may be inferred 
that some of the respondents held withdrawable mutual 
membership shares and others owned,.investment ,certificates: 
(See Martin v. California Mut. B. &; L. As.m~, 18 Ca1.2d 478 
[1l6P.2d 71].) , 
When the case was called for trial, before the first witness 
was sworn, the appellants objected to the taking of any evi-
dence upon the ground that.the complaint does not state a 
cause of action. This objection was sustained, . and judgment 
rendered for the appellants upon the pleadings. Later, the 
cOllrt granted a motion for a new trial and, upon appeal, its 
order was affirmed. (Allen v. Oalifornia Mut. B. &; L. Assn., 
40 Cal.App.2d 374 [104 P.2d 851].) This court'denied I!, peti-
tion for a hearing. ,'" , 
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Allen and his associates sued to assert rights as investors, 
hence "They were entitled to plead an action to quiet title. 
That they have done and more too." A1Elo, said the court, 
"The plaintiffs alleged that by the fraudulent representa-
tions of the defendant corporation they were induced to ex-
change securities, issued by the defendant corporation, for 
securities of State Capital Company, an agent of said defend-
ant; that such exchange was not based :m any consideration 
moving from plaintiffs to defendant; that the defendant cor-
poration still holds the securities which the plaintiffs delivered 
to it; and that all of said facts appear on the books and 
records of said defendant. In other words they alleged in 
effect'that there was merely an exchange in form but not in 
fact, and that the transaction was a mere change in the form 
of accounts between the plaintiffs and the corporate defend-
ant. Manifestly if these allegations are true, and the defend-
ants' motions admitted the truth thereof, it is clear the plain-
tiffs are and at all times have been I investors' in the defend-
ant corporation." 
Following this decision, there was a trial upon the merits. 
The trial court found that, in 1929, the association and the 
company launched a campaign for the purpose of obtaining 
investments of the one in exchange for the capital stock of 
the other. Permits were issued by the Corporation Commis-
sioner for the sale of the company's stock but these were 
conditioned upon the requirements that each sale be for cash 
and that a copy of the permit be shown to each purchaser. 
The respondents would not have exchanged their investments 
in the association for capital stock of the company but for 
the false representations made by the agents of the company 
and the association. Each of the exchanges and conversions 
of investments for ,the capital stock was void because the 
stock was not issued or sold for cash and, for the further 
reasoI)., that no copy of the permit for the sale of stock was 
exhibited to the investor. The court also found that the first 
cause of action is not 'barred by any statute of limitation 
nor are the respondents' rights barred by laches. 
From these facts, the court concluded that the -investors who 
are the respondents upon this appeal a~e entitled to a judg~ 
ment decreeing the respective transfers' made by them.: to be 
void, and restoring them to their respective status either ,~ 
July 1943] ALLEN V. CAL. MUTUAL B. & L. ASSN. 
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the holder of a pass book investment certificate or as a mutual 
shareholder in the amount and as of the date of each exchange 
appearing upon the books of the association and the company. 
Each of those persons, the court continued, has established 
a valid claim, as such investor, against the appellants for the 
amount of his investment, the claim to be paid out of the 
special trust account and reserve fund of the association's 
assets established by the commissioner and in the due course 
of the administration of the liquidation proceedings by him. 
Judgment was entered accordingly. 
The appellants now urge that as the facts fOlmd by the 
trial court clearly establish that the respondents did not 
appear upon the books of the association as investors at the 
time the commissioner took over the association and, under 
the applicable statute, only such investors are excused from 
filing claims, the trial court erred in rendering judgment for 
the respondents. But, in making this contention, say the 
respondents, the, appellants are rearguing a question now 
res judicata by the decision upon the former appeal. 
[1] It is a rule of general application that all questions 
and issues adjUdicated on a prior appeal are th,e law of the 
case upon all subsequent appeals and will not be reconsidered. 
(Wens v. Ll(YJfd, 21 Ca1.2d 452, 454-458 [132 P.2d 471]; 
Blanton v. Ourry, 20 Ca1.2d 793, 801; [129 P.2d 1] ; Gore v. 
Bingaman, 20 Ca1.2d 118, 121-123 [124P.2d 17] ; Security-
First Nat. Bank v. Marxen, 19 Ca1.2d100 [119 P.2d 131]; 
Olayt.on v. Schultz, 18 Ca1.2d 328 [115 P.2d 446] ; Penziner 
v. West American Finance 00., 10 Cal.2d 160 [74 P.2d 252].) 
[2] This doctrine applies to decisions of the District Courts of 
Appeal after they have become final. (Wells v.Lloyd, supra, 
p. 488; Gore v. Bingaman, supra, p. 122; United : Dred{j1,'ng 
00. v. Industrial Ace. Oom., 208 Cal.'705 [284P.922); Otten 
v. Spreckels, 183 CaL 252 [191 P. 11] ; Hill v. Maryland Oas-
ualty 00., 28 Cal.App. 422 [152 P. 953].) And even when, 
upon the second appeal, a court is convinced that 'the prior: 
deciSion of a question of law was erroneous, it will refuse to 
reexamine that issue in the absence of unusual' circumstarices 
leading to injustice or unfairness. (Wells v. Lloyd, 81('pra, p. 
484; Gore v. Bingaman, supra, p. 121; Penzinerv. West 
American Finance 00., supra; Hoffman v. Southern Paci{"" 
00., 215 Cal. 454 [11 P.2d 887] ; Newport v. Hatton, 207 Cal. 
515 [279 P.134] ; McEwen v. New York Life Ins. 00., 187 
22 C.2d-lll 
1, . 
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Cal. 144 [201 P. 577] ; Tally v. Ganahl, 151 Cal. 418 [90 P. 
1049] ; see England v. Hospital of Good Samaritan, 14 CaL2d 
791, 795 [97 P .2d 813].) 
Considering the decision of the District Court of .Appeal 
for the purpose of determining the extent to WhICh the 
law of the .case controls a deterInination of the present con-
troversy, it appears that upon the first appeal, as here; th~ 
association and the commissioner attacked the respondents 
complaint as insufficient to state a cause of action.. S.ince the 
respondents alleged that they had exc~anged the.Ir Interests 
in the association for shares of the capItal stock In the com-
pany, said the appellants, they no longer appeared upon t~e 
books of the association as investors, and consequently theIr 
claims were, by the express provisions of section 13.16, of 
the Building and Loan Act, Stats. 1931, p. 483, as amended, 
Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 986, barred because of the. failure 
to file the required claims with the commissioner. In rul-
ing against this contention, the Distl'ict Court of Appeal 
not only held that the complaint states 81 cause of action but 
that although they demand damages, "their complaint was 
answered and they may be a warded such .relief as comes 
within the issues. (Sec. 580, CodeCiv. Proc.) If they estab-
lish their claim as alleged, the trial court may find they are 
still the owners of their original certificates and, if so, they 
will then be entitled to present them to the defendant com-
missioner and share in subsequent dividends as provided in 
Act 986, supra. Section 13.16, paragraph 3, contains this 
sentence: 'Any investor, without presenting a claim, shall be 
entitled as to any dividends hereafter declared, to share in 
such di;idends to the extent, and in the proper relative order 
of priorit~, o~ a~y claim sho~n by the bo?k~ of, ~~e associa-
tion to eXIst In hIS favor agaInst the aSSOCIatIOn. (Allen v. 
Oalifornia Mut. B. & L. Assn., supra, p. 379.) 
[3] It is true, of course, that if the respondents' evidence 
does not prove the allegations of the complaint which was 
considered upon the former appeal, the doctrine of the law 
of the case does n~t apply. (Archer v. Oity of Los Angeles, 
19 Ca1.2d 19, 29 [119 P.2d 1].) And the appellants charge 
. that although the findings of the trial court, in terms relate 
facts which the District Court of Appeal said were, in effect, 
pleaded by the respondents, they aTe not supported by the 
evidence. 
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It is not necessary to question the appellants' assertion 
that the withdrawals of the respondents' investmentsap-
peared by appropriate entries in the books of the association. 
at the time the commissioner took. over the association for the 
purpose of liquidation because the former decision clearly 
contemplates this situation. Under such circumstances, sald 
the District. Court of Appeal, if the respondentswerede~ 
frauded, they are entitled to a decree declaring 'them still 
. to be investors in the association, such restoration being 
effective as of the date of the exchange. 
. [4] And considering other eVidence which is admitted by 
the appellants to be true, it is clear that the respondents have 
proved a case within the decision upon the prior appeal: 
Thus it is conceded that the company was organized to pur-
chase the guarantee stock of the association then outstanding. 
In accordance with this plan, the 8lSsociation and the com-
pany fraudulently induced' the respondents to agree to ex-' 
, change their. investmentS i:n the aSsociation for the capital 
stock of the company. To consummate the transaction, the 
respondents were induced to sign orders on' 'the association 
. for the withdrawa:l of their deposits. These they delivered 
to the stock salesmen together with their pass books. By ap-
','propriate entries the orders were subsequently credited to 
the purchase by the company of the guarantee stock of the 
association. And findings that the company did riot receive 
any cash for the sale of its stock other than by means of the 
credits upon the purch8lSe of the association's guarantee 
shares, or that the permits were not exhibited to the respond-
ents as required by their terms, stand Imquestioned. ' 
[5a] The District Court of Appeal concluded that an or-
der sustaining an objection to the introduction of any evidence 
upon the ground that the complaint does not state a cause of 
action is, in effect, the same as one granting a nonsuit. This 
holding places an order which is based upon the construction 
of a pleading in the same category as one predicated upon an . 
evaluation of evidence. But eliminating that procedural ques-
tion from present consideration, the court held that those 
investors who, by reason of fraudulent representations, made 
transfers of their certificates, or amounts represented thereby, 
which appear upon the books of the association, continue to 
be "the owners of their original certificates." As such owners 
" ,~ 
! , 
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they are entitled to share in subsequent dividends declared 
by the commissioner. 
It is difficult to follow that reasoning. Until 1935, the 
Building and Loan Association Act, supra, provided that 
"the claim of any investor, appearing upon the books of the 
association to be a valid claim," might be presented later 
than those of creditors or investors generally. (Stats. 1933, 
p. 2719; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1933 Supp., Act 986, §13.16.) 
Effective September 15, 1935, "Any investor, without pre-
senting a claim, shall be entitled, as to any dividends here-
after declared, to share in such dividends to the extent, and 
in the proper relative order of priority, of any claim shown 
by the books of the association to exist in his favor . . ." 
(Stats. 1935, p. 1500; Deering's Gen. Laws, 1935 Supp., Act 
986, §13.16.) If the District Court of Appeal correctly con-
strued the statute, 8! commissioner endeavoring to liquidate 
an association will encounter many practical difficulties. How 
may he know whether any particular, person whose name 
appears on the books of the association as having been, at 
one time, an investor, assigned his certificate by reason of 
fraudulent representations, or in a transact.ion in which there 
was a failure of consideration, or under other circumstances 
which enables him to later attack the trandfer Y And how far 
back in time must the commissioner go in scrutinizing the 
record of· transfers Y 
[6] A fuller consideration of the question than could b& 
given in connection with the petition for a hearing in thi!\ 
court of the prior appeal leads to the conclusion that the 
Legislature in 1935, and also by the prior enactment, in. 
tended to liberalize the statutory requirements for the filing 
of a claim in favor of one who, as admitted by the books of 
the association, was an investor of the institution at the time 
it was taken over by the commissioner. The purpose of a 
claim is to give the commissioner, information concerning 
an indebtedness of the institution. If the books of the asso-
. ciation show the. indebtedness, said the Legislature, the in-
vestor should not be required to present a 'claim which dupli-
cates the data on its own records. [5b] But to say that an 
investor whose withdrawal order or assignment of the certificate 
which evidenced his deposit of money has been recorded on 
the books of the association is still an investor according to 
those books, ignores the meaning' of the statute and the 
obvious purpose of its enactment. 
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[7] However, although the District Court of Appeal erro-' 
neously construed and applied these provisions of the Build-
ing and Loan Act, supra, the trial court's determination of 
the rights of the respondents, by following the law of the 
case, leads to no such result as is contemplated by the rule 
which allows an exception to that doctrine when an applica" 
tion of it would bring about an injustice. (See Jtngland v. 
Hospital of Good Samaritan, supra, p. 791.) On the merits, 
the respondents have the same rights to share in the pro-
ceeds of the liquidation as the plaintiffs in the Alexander 
case, who similarly exchanged investment certificates or mu-
tual shares in the association for the capital stock of the 
company, and it appears that the commissioner has set aside 
an amount sufficient to pay their demands, on a pro rata basis, 
with those of the judgment creditors in the earlier litigation. 
Under these circumstances, as, by the law of the case, the 
evidence fully supports the judgment, the respondents are 
entitled to restoration to their respective iI],terests as holders 
of investment certificates and as mutual shareholders in the 
association, and also to the dividends declared in the liquida-
tionproceedings. (Alexander v. State Oapital 00., supra.) 
A second point which is urged as a ground for the reversal 
of the judgment is the trial court's ruling that the cause 
of action is not barred by the statute of limitations relied 
upon by the appellants, nor by laches. Assuming that the 
claim of each of the respondents appears upon the books of 
the company, say the appellants, that record shows him to be 
only a former investor, who, because of the alleged fraud, 
has a cause of action either for damages or for, restoration 
to his former status as an investor. In either case, they insist, 
the gravamen of the action is fraud. And, as a stockholder, 
each respondent is charged with notice of what was spread 
upon the records of the company; therefore, his cause of ac-
tion is barred by the provisions of subdivision 4 of section 
338 of the Code of Civil Procedure establishing 8J three year 
period of limitation for the commencement of an action for 
relief upon the ground of fraud. . 
[8] As a general rule, all questions presented by the 
record must be raised upon the first appeal from an adverse 
ruling, as thereafter all matters within the scope of the action 
and relevant to the issues will be dMmed to have been con--
eluded by the jUdgment. Moreover, in any laterconsidera .. 
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tion of the controversy, it will be held that the judgment, by 
implication, if not directly, has determined all issues related 
to the subject matter and raised by proper pleadings. (Mc-
Candless v, City of Los Angeles, 10 Cal.App.2d 407, 413 [52 
P.2d 545] ; Texas Co. v. Moynier, 137 Cal.App, 112, 113 [29 
P.2d 873] ; 5 C,J.S., Appeal and Error, §1825, n. 7, p. 1279; 
and see Sutphin v. Speik, 15 Cal.2d 195, 202 [99 P,2d 652. 
101 P.2d 497] ; Barrow v. Santa Monica B. Sup. Co., 9 CaL2d 
601,606 [71 P.2d 1108] ; A.ndrews v. Reidy, 7 Ca1.2d 366,370, 
371 [60 P.2d 832] ; Lanktree v. Lanktree, 6 Cal.2d 120,122 
[56P.2d 943J; Price v. Sixth District Agricultural Assn., 201 
Cal. 502, 511-513 [258 P. 387].) [9] The sufficiency of the 
second amended complaint, filedin February, 1936, wasthe sub-
stantial issue raised in the prior appeal. It charges that 
during the years 1929 to 1931 inclusive, by reason of the 
fraudulent representations df the association, the respondents 
exchanged their investments in it for stock of the State Cap-
ital Company. If it be assumed that the records of a corpora-
tion place its stockholders upon notice' to the extent claimed 
by the appellants, the complaint does not state a cause of 
action but it is not now subject to attack. 
Where it appears upon the face of the complaint that 
a cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations, and 
the statute is pleaded, a judgment triay be rendered for the 
defendant if the case is submitted upon the pleadings. 
(W ormouth v. Hatch, 33 Cal. 121; 16 Cal.Jur., Limitation of 
Actions, § 212, p. 618.) The appellants, in their answer, have 
pleaded the provisions of section 338, subdivision 4 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure as barring the cause of action stated 
in the second amended complaint. If, therefore, theappel. 
lants' contention as to the notice given by the. corporation's 
books is sounCl, the trial court properly entered judgment for 
them upon the pleadings. Implicit, therefore, in the order 
granting the respondents' motion for a new trial which was 
" , 
affirmed upon appeal, is the holding that the cause of action 
is not barred by the statute of limitations. (McCowen v .. Pew, 
18 Cal.App. 302 [123 P. 191], Reclamation Dist. No .. 3 v. 
Goldman, 65 Cal. 635 [4 P. 676], and see 2 Cal.Jur:, Ap"peal 
and Error, § 568, pp. 966, 967.) 
[10] Another. reason which is urged as a ground for the 
reversal of the judgment, is that the respondents were notified 
of the fraudulent misrepresentations upon the receipt in De-
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cember, 1931, of certificates of stock of the State Capital 
Company. Immediately upon receiving a certificate of stock, 
say the appellants, those who claim to haVE: acted upon the 
representations of the association were put on notice that 
they had no right to withdraw their money from the company," 
for any such preference would have to bestlited in the stock 
certificate .. This argument admits the absence from the stock 
certificate of any express language that a stockholder might 
withdraw his investment in the State Capital Company. But 
even if he could be charged with kriowledge based upon the 
.statutory requirements, as to form, of a stock certificate, the 
discovery of the falsity of the statement concerning a right 
to withdraw did not give him notice. that otherrepre.sentatioris 
concerning the company were untrue. ; 
[11] Nor does the fact that, after,no dividerid was declared" 
in . December, i931, .some of the respondents admittedly en-' 
deavored to obtain from the company's officers the amount' of 
their investments, or that some of them .joined a s~ockholders' 
committee which employed an attorney to protect their in-" 
terests, . necessarily compel a holding' that the statute of limi. 
tations commenced to run as of that date. For the . record 
shows that the officers of the association .and the company 
"countered the complaints of the" respondents with explana-
tionsbased upon the then current economic ,depression and 
promises of prospective earnings. This and other testimony 
in the record adequately supports the finding of the trial court 
that the respondents continued to rely upon the good faith, 
wisdom, and advice of the officers and directors respecting 
the two corporations and did not learn that the. stock was 
valueless until the adjUdication in bankruptcy of the com-
pany in March, '1933, and· the pubIlcatiori two' months later 
by the commissioner of the notice to creditors of .the asso. 
ciation. . ' 
[12] The appellants also rely upon the provision of section 
.348 of the Code of Civil Procedure that, when a building and 
loan. association has become insolvent. and is in the process of 
liquidation, "the statute of limitations shall be deemed to 
haveeommenced to run from the beginhingof the process of 
liquidation." Since the Building and Loan Commissioner 
took over the assets of the California Building and Loan'" 
Association in January, 1933, they assert, this action, filed 
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4 of section 338 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But assuming, 
without deciding, that the process of liquidation, within the 
meaning of section 348, supra, commenced upon the date of 
the take-over by the cOrimlissioner, the appellants may not 
now raise the issue that the action is for that reason barred. 
For, the complaint shows the facts upon which the appellants' 
contention is based, and by their answer the statute now relied 
upon was pleaded as a defense. The issue was therefore before 
the trial court when it ruled upon the pleadings and is con-
cluded by the affirmance of the order granting a new trial. 
[13] Concerning the equitable defense, it is well settled that 
delay alone does not constitute laches unless it is accompanied 
by circumstances from which prejudice may result. (Alexan-
der v. State Oapital 00., 9 Cal.2d 304, 313 [70 P.2d 619], 
Gibson v. Mitchell, 9 Ca1.2d 718, 725, 726 [72 P.2d 740], Se-
curity T.& S. Bank v. Southern Pac. R. R. 00., 214 Cal. 81, 
88 [3 P.2d 1015], Wolpert v. Gripton, 213 Cal. 474, 483 [2 
P.2d 767], Silver Burdett 00. v. State Board of Education, 
36 Cal.App.2d 714, 719 [98 P.2d 533].) Here, as was said in 
Alexander v. State Oapital 00., supra, "There is no sugges-
tion . . . that the lapse of time resulted in any injury to the 
Building and Loan Association, nor has it been made to ap-
pear that by reason of lapse of time it is inequitable to enforce 
the demands of the respondents." And the unchallenged find-
ing of the trial court is that the commissioner has created a 
special trust and reserve fund for the purpose of paying the 
respondents' claims should they be declared valid by the ,court. 
[14] In 1935, the provision which allowed "the claim of 
any investor, appearing upon the books of the association to 
be a valid claim, presented after the expiration of the" statu-
tory time, to share in any subsequently declared dividend, was 
relaxed to allow an investor, without filing a claim, to share 
in any dividend declared after the effective date of the amend-
ment.The obvious purpose of the statute is to protect the 
investor whose creditor relation appears without contradiction 
upon the books of the association from losing his rig!lt to 
share in the liquidation of the insolvent organization's assets 
through negligence or inadvertance in failing to file a claim 
within the prescribed period. The use of the word "hereafter" 
expresses the legislative intention that the amendment should 
apply to dividends declared after September 15, 1935, its 
effective date, in the assets of associations then in the process 
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of liquidation. As the first dividend of the California Building 
and Loan Association was declared on December 2, 1935, aI-
,though none of the respondents filed a claim,each of them is 
entitled to share in the first and all subsequent, dividends. 
[15a] , But the appellants assert that, under the decision 
upon the prior appeal, the respondents are not entitled to 
share in any liquidating dividends declared prior to the judg-
ment establishing their claims. In support of their contention, 
they refer to the concluding paragraph of the opinion, which 
reads: "As the action must go back to the trial court for 
further proceedings, it should be stated that we notice the use 
of the word 'hereafter' in the statute we have just quoted. It 
is evidently a misprint for 'thereafter.' Any other construc-
tion would lead to absurd results. To illustrate; let us assume 
that since September 1, 1935, dividends have been' declared 
and paid as provided in Act 986, supra. The sentence we have 
quoted took effect on the date last mentioned. According to 
the meaning of said sentence 'as it is written, all sums so paid 
would have to be recalled, reapportioned, and these plaintiffs 
included. As stated above' that would be Illl absurdity. Con-
struing the word as thereafter instead of hereafter, the sen-
tence has a reasonable meaning. Those who delay in present-
ing their claims lose their rights to partic~pate in dividends 
"theretofore declared and paid, but after their claims have been 
presented, as in said sentence provided, they are then entitled 
to the rights provided therein." 
This discussion is obviously based upon the erroneous as-
sumption that the presentation of a claim by the investor was 
still required under the 1935 amendment, and this in spite 
of the inclusion of, the words "without presenting a claim" in 
. the statute. [16] And the doctrine of the law of the case does . 
not require this court to follow an interpretation which is 
clearly obiter dictum. [15b] The statement of facts in the dis-
cussion, assumed for the purpose of illustrating the necessity of 
the court's construction of the statute, presupposed a situa-
tion where the commissioner paid out all of the liquidating 
dividends accruing subsequent to September 1, 1935, with-
out establishing a reserve or trust account for the benefit of' 
the investors who had not filed claims with him, and, conse-
quently, to allow such investors to share in dividends already 
apportioned and paid in their entirety to the other creditors 
would have required the amounts paid to be recalled and 
' .. ' 
:';\ 
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reapportioned. But upon trial, the court found that the 
commissioner had created a trust account, for the benefit of 
the respondents, and had. placed in it a ratable amount of 
each of the dividends he had theretofore declared from the 
proceeds on liquidation. 
After decreeing that the respondents be restored as holders 
of passbO'O'k investment certificates in the appellant assO'cia-
tion, the judgment O'rders that each of them recO'ver the 
amO'unt O'f such investment certificate account and for costs, 
"with interests prO'vided by his, O'r her, O'r their, respective . 
investment certificate to' date O'f payment." The appellants 
assert that interest is' only payable up to the time O'f in-
solvency. 
[17] When the Building and LO'an CO'mmissiO'ner takes 
possessiO'n of the property, business and assets O'f a building 
and IO'an assO'ciatiO'n which he deems to' he in an insO'lvent O'r 
unsafe financial cO'ndition, his future actiO'n is nO't limited 
to the liquidatiO'n and distributiO'n Of its assets, but he may 
administer the affairs ·O'f the cO'mpany sO' as to restore, if 
PO'ssible, its ecO'nO'mic stability and then consent to' th~ assO'-
CiatiO'n's resumptiO'n O'fbusiness upon cO'nditions apprO'ved 
by him. (Stats. 1931, ch. 269, p. 540; Deering's Gen. Laws, 
Act 986, §13.11.) If·· the assO'ciatiO'n is allO'wed to' resume 
business as a gO'ing cO'ncern, it should assume its continuing 
O'bligatiO'n to' pay interest UPO'n the depO'sits O'f its investO'rs, 
even as to'. the periO'd during which its assets were in the tem-
porary cO'ntrol of the cO'mmissioner. But,if instead O'f restO'r-' 
ing the prO'perty, business and assets to' the assO'ciatiO'n, the 
commissiO'ner determines to' liquidate them, the right O'f the 
investO'rs to' interest shO'uld be subject to' the usual equitable 
principle gO'verning liquidatiO'n, namely, E'qtlality amO'ng cred-
itO'rs. [18] In the absence O'f an express statutO'ry prO'vi-
siO'n uPO'n the matter, an investO'r in a building and IO'an assO'-
ciatiO'n in the prO'cessO'f liquidatiO'n by the cO'mmissiO'ner is 
nO't .entitled to' the payment O'f interest on his claim after the 
cO'mmencement O'f the liquidatiO'n prO'ceeding, where . the 
assets are insufficient to' pay the principal O'f all claims in 
full. (In re Pacific Coast Bldg.-Loan Assn., ~5 Ca1.2d 134, 
147 [99 P.2d 251J;) U;nder this rule, as the resPO'ndents 
alleged and the cO'urt fO'und that the assets and prO'perty Qf 
the association UPO'n liquidation will enable its creditQrs and 
investO'rs to' receive apprO'ximately 65 cents O'n each dO'liar 
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O'wed them, the determinatiO'n cO'ncerning interest is er-
rO'neO'us. 
[19] The determinatiO'n O'f the cO'mmissiO'ner to' liquidate 
an assO'ciatiO'n, after taking PO'ssessiO'n O'f its prO'perty, busi-
ness, and assets, is evidenced by the filing O'f an inventO'ry O'f 
its assets and the publicatiO'n O'f nO'tice to' all persO'ns having 
claims against it,' whether as creditQrs or investors or other-
wise, to' prese;nt them within a specified periO'd. (Sec. 13.16.) 
But by stipulation O'f the parties, they have agreed that liqui-
datiQn of the assO'ciatiO'n commenced on January 23, 1933. 
Accordingly, the judgment is mO'dified by striking therefrQm 
the wQrds "to' date Qf payment" (par. 3) and inserting in 
lieu thereQf "to' January 23, 1933," and as sO' modified, the 
judgment is affirmed, resPQndents to' recO'ver CO'sts UPQn ap-
peal. 
GibsQn, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Carter, J., CQn-
curred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. The majority QpiniQn cO'ncedes 
. nQt. Qnly that plaintiffs failed to' present a claim to' the Build-
higand Loan CO'mmissiQner pursuant to' sectiO'n 13.16 Qf the 
Building and LO'an AssO'ciation Act (Deering1s Gen. Laws, 
Act 986) but that under a prO'per cQnstructiQn,of~ th~ ,Mt 
they CQuid not be regarded as investors excusedfrQm pre .. 
sentfugclaims since their claims did nQt appear. on· the 
boO'ks Qf the assQciatiQn. Plaintiffs are thus allQwedto reCQver 
without cQmplyfug with the statutQry conditiQns tQrecQvery. 
I dO' nO't agree that this paradQx is compeUedby the doctrlD.e 
of the law Qf the case. 
The first appeal in this actiO'n involved the sufficiency Qf' 
the allegatiO'ns Qf plaintiffs' secQnd amended cQmplaint.The 
present appeal invQlves the sufficiency Qf the evidence . to' . 
supPQrt the findings and judgment. The QpiniQn of the' Dis-
trict Court Qf Appeal Qn the first appeal sets fQrth that para-
graph III Qf the secO'nd amended cQmplaint' alleged that 
plaintiffs were investQrs within the meaning of sectiQn 13.16 
Qf the Building and Loan AssO'ciatiQn Act· (Deering's Gen. 
Laws, Act 986). It appears that defendants cQntended 
that there was an incO'nsistency between the specific allega-
tiO'n Qf paragraph X of the secQnd amended complaint that 
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State Capital Company; and the general allegations of para-
graph III, and that the specific allegation was controlling. 
(Little v. Union Oil 00., 73 Cal.App. 612 [238 P. 1066]; 
Aitken v. Stewart, 129 Cal.App. 38 [18 P.2d 988].) The 
court declared that this contention would be perSuasive if 
there were no other facts involved. "But there are many 
other allegations. The plaintiffs alleged that by the fraudu-
lent representations of the defendant corporation they were 
induced to exchange securities, issued by the defendant cor-
poration, for securities of State Capital Company, an agent 
of said defendant; that such exchange was not based on any 
consideration moving from plaintiffs to defendant; that the 
defendant corporation still holds the securities which the 
plaintiffs delivered to' it; and that all of said facts appear on 
the books and records of said defendant. [Italics added.] 
In other words they alleged in effect that there was merely an 
exchange in form but not in fact, and that the transaction 
was a mere change in form of accounts'between the plaintiffs 
and the corporate defendant. Manifestly if these allegations 
are true, and the defendants' motions admitted the truth 
thereof, it is clear the plaintiffs are and at all times have 
been 'investors' in the defendant corporation. We are unable 
to say, therefore, that the plaintiffs' complaint did not state 
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action." (40 Cal. 
App.2d 374, 378-379 [104 P.2d 851].) 
. It is clear from the foregoing that the second amended 
complaint was held to state a cause of action not simply be-
cause of the alleged fraud, but because all the facts showing 
the fraud and showing the exchange to be without considera-
tion and merely an exchange in form, appeared on the books 
'and records of the defendant. This allegation that all such 
facts appeared on the books and records of defendant relates 
to the terms of section 13.16 that an investor need not present 
a claim with respect to "any claim shown by the books of the 
association to exist in his favor against the association." 
Nothing in the record, however, indicates that such facts 
appeared on defendant's books and records. The books of 
the defendant association showed that plaintiffs ceased to be 
certificate holders in the &'ssociation between 1929 and 1931. 
The books of the State Capital Company showed that at 
about the same time plaintiffs became stockholders in that 
company. Plaintiffs do not state the nature of their action, 
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but whether it is an action for rescission, for damages, or to 
quiet title, the claims asserted did not appear upon the books, 
and records of the association. They are therefore harred by 
the provisions of the Building and Loan Association Act 
relating to the presentation of claims in ~iqri~da~ion. . 
The majority opinion does not rest wIth Its Interpretation 
of the opinion of the District Court of Appeal but' extends 
the doctrine of the law of the case to issues thlitwere not 
considered in that opinion. In the present appeal defend-
ants contend that plaintiffs' rights are barred by the statute 
of limitations. The majority opinion holds that'since the 
availability of this defense was established by ,the pleadings, 
the District Court of Appeal determined that the statute was 
inapplicable by holding the pleadings sufficient even though 
that court did not mention the statute. It has long been 
settled in this state, however, that only issues considered in 
the earlier opinion become the law of the case. (Trower v. 
Oity and Oounty of San ]j'rancisco, 157 CIl!. 762, 765 [109 P. 
617] ; Tally v. Ganahl, 151 Cal. 418, 421 [90 P. 1049] ; Oen- . 
tral Nat. Bank v. Peck, 15 Cal.,App.2d 512 [59 P.2d 599] ; 
see Moore v. Trott, 162 Cal. 268, 273 [122 P. 462] ; Mattingly 
v. Pennie, 105 Cal. 514 [39 P. 200, 45 Am. St. Rep. 87] ; Oow-
ell v. Snyder, 171 Cal. 291, 297 [165 P. 920] ; Klauber v. San 
Diego Street Oar 00., 98 Cal. 105, 107 [32 P. 876].) With 
two exceptions, the cases relied upon in the majority opinion 
involved res judicata, and the rule announced in relation to 
that doctrine has no application to the doctrine of the law 
of the case. The first of the two cases not concerned with 
res judicata, Texas 00. v. 1I!0ynier, 137 Cal.App. 112 [29 P.2d 
873], holds merely that when a judgment ~s r~versed with 
directions, the trial court must follow the chrectIons. In the 
second, People v. Walton, 10 Cal.App.2d 413 [51P.2d 1117], 
the court disposed of a question on the merits, noting that 
the opinion on a previous appeal had reached the same result. 
The doctrine of res judicata does not require a court to decide 
a case on an erroneous basis, as the law of the case does, and 
is therefore not so narrowly applied. (Allen v. Bryant, 155 
Cal. 256, 258 [100 P. 704] ; see England v. Hospital of Good 
Samaritan, 14 Ca1.2d 791,795 [97 P.2d 8]3] ; 2 Cal.Jur. 947.) 
It is designed to make a judgment the final determination of 
a lawsuit by precluding the parties from presenting the same 
cause anew even when they have additional arguments. The 
.• 
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decision that is the law of the case, however, Is made in antici-
pation of further litigation, and is intended not as a final 
dete.rmination of the rights of the parties but as a guide upon 
~etrIal. ~t. does not foreclose the consideration of new legal 
Issues arISIng from changes in the evidence or pleadings 
(Cowell v. Snyder, supra; Bayer v. Barrett, 127 Cal.App. 
~05 [15P.2d 801] ; 5 C.J.S. 1508; 2 Cal.Jnr. 951), and there 
IS no reason why it should foreclose the presentation of issues 
not previously considered. 
Schauer, J., concurred. 
[L. A. No. 17734. In Bank. July 14, 1943.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. WESTERN 
FRUIT GROWERS, INC. (a Corporation), Respond-
ent; W. B. PARKER, as Director of Agriculture, etc., 
et al., Cross-Defendants and Appellants. 
[1] Agriculture - Regulation - Agricultural Adjustment Acts.-
The purpose of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1935 as 
amended in 193~ (Stats. 1.937, p. 2501; Deering's Gen. L~ws, 
1937, Act 146), IS to provIde a regulation of intrastate' com-
me;rce wh~ch will be correlated with the corresponding regu-
latIon of mterstate commerce in the same commodities. 
[2] ~onstitutional Law-Constitut~onality of Statutes-Presump_ 
tlons':-A:ll pr~sumptions and intendments are in favor of the 
constItutIOnalIty of a statute, and all doubts should be re-
solved in favor of its validity. 
[3] Statutes-Amendment-Re-enactment and Republication.-
C.onst., art. IV, § 24, which declares that no law shall be re-
VIsed or amended by reference to its title, but that it shall 
[1] Federal and State Agricultural Adjustment Acts notes 98 
A.L.R.1195; 102 A.L.R. 937; 114 A.L.R. 136. See, also,' 1 Cal.Jur. 
873; 2 Am.Jur. 416. 
[2] See 5 Cal,Jur. 628; 11 Am.Jur. 776. 
[3] See 23 Cal.Jur. 682. 
. Mc~. Dig. References: [1,8, 13-15] Agriculture, § 4; [2] Coli-
stItutIOnal. La~, § 56; [3, 5-7] Statutes, § 74; [4] Statutes, §73; 
[9] ConstItutIonal Law, § 156; [10] Constitutional Law §§ 156 
164; [11] Constitutional Law, § 163; [12] Statutes, § 33. ' , 
/ 
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be re-enacted, and published at length as revised or amended, 
is to he' reasonably construed and limited in application to 
the sp~cific, evil which such provision was designed toroni-
edy. It is, not to, be used as,a weapon for s~riking down 
'legislation which may not reasonably be said ,to have been 
enacted contrary to the specified, method. 
[4] Id.-Amendment-Modes, of Altering Statute.--Incomplying 
withConst., art. IV,§ 24, the Legislature' may use either an ' 
existing statute or a section of it as the basis for changing 
an existing law. The decision as to which unit is to be used 
is one to be made by the Legislature in its discretion, and its 
'determination will not be questioned by the courts. 
[5] Id.-Amendment-Rc-enactment and Repllblication.-While 
abstractly there may be differences in meaning between the 
words "revise" and "amend," they arc ,interchangeable in the 
sense in which they are used in' ponst., art~ IV,§ 24; in . 
either case the revising or amending 'act is intended asa sub-
stitute for the original stntuteor section, continuing. in force 
that which is re-enacted and repealing . what is omitted. 
[6] Id.-Amendment-Re-enactment and R~publication.-If the 
Legislature elects to change a statute by the method'ofsec-
tion~bycsection amendment, no constitutional violation occurs 
so long as each section is published and re-enacted at length, 
,r«:igardless of the num:ber of sections so changed. 
.. [7]' Id..~Amendmcnt-Re-enactment. and Republication-Agricul-
tural Products Marketing Act ....... lnasmuch as the title.of Agri~ 
cultural Products Marketing Act of 1937 .recites :that it is 
"An 'act .to amend" the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1935 
"by amendmg" enumerated sections' "to add a new section .•• 
and' to repeal" certai:n sections of· the 1935 . law ,the. Legisla-
ture intended· to use thesection-by-section amendment 'pro-
cedure, and as it published at lEip,gth the sections as, amended, 
there was no violation of the mandate of Const.;art . .rV;§24. 
. [Sa, Sb] A:griculture-Regulation-Agricultural· A:d3¥stment ~cts" 
-Licenses-Validity-of Legisla.tion ContitJ.uiJlgLfcenses Pre-, 
viously Issued.-Under the 1931 an.tlndmentto ~AgricU1turar 
Adjustment Act of 1935" § 18, the continuance of licenses 
theretofore issued by the Director of Agriculture. upon,.,dif- ~ 
ferentbut valid .conditions, without subjecting those operating 
under such licenses to the·' new requireinents for' the issuance 
of licenses in the future wider said amendments, did not con-
stituteunreasonable class legislation . 
[9] . Constitutional' Law-Equltl ;Protectionof Laws-Class Legis-
. lation-Reasonableness of Classification • .....:.The,constitutional 
prohibition of special legislation does. not, preclude legislative 
